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CONFLICT OF LAWS-FOREIGN EXECUTORS AND AoMINISTRATORS-CON-
STITUTIONALITY OF NONRESIDENT MOTORIST STATUTE PROVIDING FOR JURIS-
DICTION OVER PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES-Decedent was killed when his 
car collided with another on a Missouri highway. Both the driver of the 
second car and its owner, residents of Nebraska, were also killed. Dece-
dent's widow brought a wrongful death action. in Missouri against the 
Nebraska-appointed adminstratrixes of the estates of the driver and the 
owner of the second car. Summonses were served on the Secretary of State 
of Missouri in compliance with the Missouri Long Arm Statute which 
specifically provides for service upon and jurisdiction over the admini-
strators of the estates of nonresident motorists.1 The trial court overruled 
defendants' motions to quash: On petition for writ of prohibition, urging 
that the trial court had no jurisdiction, held, preliminary rule in prohibi-
tion discharged. The statute is a constitutional exercise of the police power. 
The assumption of jurisdiction over the foreign administratrix of the 
estate of a nonresident motorist involved in an accident in the state does 
not violate due process. State ex rel. Sullivan v. Cross, (Mo. 1958) 314 S.W. 
(2d) 889. 
No jurisdiction over foreign administrators of nonresident motorists 
may be obtained under nonresident motorist statutes not containing speci-
fic provision for such jurisdiction.2 For this reason twenty-two states have 
recently amended their statutes to include within their scope jurisdiction 
1 Mo. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1952; Supp. 1958) §506.210. 
2 Two separate grounds may be found for these holdings. (1) The statute is in deroga-
tion of the common law and must be strictly construed. See, e.g., Gregory v. White, (W.D. 
S.C. 1957) 151 F. Supp. 761; Riggs v. Schneider's Exr., 279 Ky. 361, 130 S.W. (2d) 816 
(1939); State ex rel. Ledin v. Davison, 216 Wis. 216, 256 N.W. 718 (1934). (2) The agency 
for service of process is terminated by the death of the principal. See, e.g., Brogan v. 
Macklin, 126 Conn. 92, 9 A. (2d) 499 (1939); Dowling v. Winters, 208 N.C. 521, 181 S.E. 
751 (1935). See generally Culp, "Recent Developments in Actions Against Nonresident 
Motorists," 37 MICH. L. REv. 58 (1938). 
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over personal representatives.3 Seven of the eight cases to date arising 
under these statutes have upheld jurisdiction over the foreign administra-
tor.4 While these amendments have successfully removed the previous 
impediments to jurisdiction,5 attacks on their constitutional validity have 
raised new questions. It is generally held that an administrator is immune 
from suit in his representative capacity outside the state of his appoint-
ment.6 Some courts regard an action against an administrator as a pro-
ceeding in rem against the assets of the estate; hence, jurisdiction would 
fail because the out-of-state court has no control over the res.7 More 
often courts have held that because an administrator is an officer of the 
court which appoints him, his ability to act is coterminus with the ter-
ritorial limitations of the appointing court. Outside that area he has no 
official standing.8 This rule of immunity has been used to invalidate 
statutes which provide for general jurisdiction over foreign administra-
tors.9 Its logical application in the principal case dictates the same result, 
s Ala. Code (1940; Supp. 1957) tit. 7, §199; Ark. Stat. (1947) §27-341; Cal. Veh. Code 
Ann. (Deering, 1948; Supp. 1957) §404; Fla. Stat. (1957) §47.29; Ky. Rev. Stat. (1956) 
§188.020; La. Rev. Stat. (1950; Supp. 1956) §13-3474: Md. Code Ann. (1957) art. 66½, 
§ll5(f); Mass. Laws Ann. (1954) c. 90, §3A; Mich. Comp. Laws (1948; Supp. 1956) 
§257.403; Mo. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1952; Supp. 1958) §506.210; Neb. Rev. Stat. (1943; re-issue 
1956) §25-530; N.M. Stat. Ann. (1953) §64-24-3; 62A N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1952; 
Supp. 1958) §52; N.C. Gen. Stat. (1953; Supp. 1957) §1-105; N.D. Rev. Code (1943; Supp. 
1957) §28-06ll; Ohio Rev. Code (Baldwin, 1958) §2703.20; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1953; 
Supp. 1957) tit. 75, §1201; Tenn. Code Ann. (1956) §20-225; Tex. Civ. Stat. (Vernon, 1950; 
Supp. 1958) art. 2039a; Va. Code (1957) §8-67.1; Wis. Stat. (1957) §345.09; Wyo. Comp. 
Stat. Ann. (1945; Supp. 1957) §60-1101. 
4 Brooks v. National Bank of Topeka, (8th Cir. 1958) 251 F. (2d) 37; Feinsinger v. 
Bard, (7th Cir. 1952) 195 F. (2d) 45; Tarczynski v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. Co., 261 
Wis. 149, 52 N.W. (2d) 396 (1952); Plopa v. DuPre, 327 Mich. 660, 42 N.W. (2d) 777 (1950); 
Leighton v. Roper, 300 N.Y. 434, 91 N.E. (2d) 876 (1950); Oviatt v. Garretson, 205 Ark. 
792, 171 S.W. (2d) 287 (1943). Contra, Knoop v. Anderson, (N.D. Iowa 1947) 71 F. Supp. 
832. See also Derrick v. New England Greyhound Lines, (D.C. Mass. 1957) 148 F. Supp. 
496, where it was held the statute did not purport to confer jurisdiction. 
5 The argument based on strict construction is eliminated. The courts hold further 
that such a statute is not limited by common law rules of agency. E.g., Oviatt v. Garretson, 
note 4 supra: State ex rel. Sullivan v. Cross, (Mo. 1958) 314 S.W. (2d) 889; Plopa v. 
DuPre, note 4 supra. 
6 Generally courts cannot acquire jurisdiction over a foreign administrator even by 
his consent or through personal service within the state. In re Estate or Thompson v. 
Coyle &: Co., 339 Mo. 410, 97 S.W. (2d) 93 (1936); Burrowes v. Goodman, (2d Cir. 1931) 
50 F. (2d) 92, cert. den. 284 U.S. 650 (1931); Judy v. Kelley, 11 Ill. 211 (1849); CoNFLict OF 
LAws llEsTATEMENT §513 (1934). But cf. Lawrence v. Nelson, 143 U.S. 215 (1892). Contra: 
Lackner v. M'Kechney, (7th Cir. 1918) 252 F. 403; Laughlin &: McManus v. Solomon, 
180 Pa. 177, 36 A. 704 (1897). 
7Thorburn v. Gates, (S.D. N.Y. 1915) 225 F. 613; Wilson v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 
(8th Cir. 1908) 164 F. 817; McDOWELL, FOREIGN PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES 83 (1957). 
8 Vaughn v. Northrup, 15 Pet. (40 U.S.) 1 (1841); Appeal of Gantt, 286 App. Div. 
212, 141 N.Y.S. (2d) 738 (1955); Hargrave v. Turner Lumber Co., 194 La. 285, 193 S. 648 
(1940): Jefferson v. Beall, 117 Ala. 436, 23 s. 44 (1897): CoNFLicr OF LAWS RESTATEMENT 
§512 (1934). But see Johnson v. Jackson, 56 Ga. 326 (1876). See generally GOODRICH, CoN-
FLicr OF LAws, 3d ed., §190 (1949). 
9 Thorburn v. Gates, note 7 supra; Feldman v. Gross, (N.D. Ohio 1952) 106 F. Supp. 
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on the ground that the statute violates due process by asserting jurisdic-
tion where none can be acquired.10 One court has so held.11 But it has 
been suggested that the exercise of jurisdiction in this type situation is 
not unconstitutional because the immunity rule is not jurisdictional in 
nature but is a rule of comity based on the convenience of administering 
estates.12 This contention, however, goes against the established weight of 
authority13 and has not been seized upon by the courts to sustain the 
statutes.14 Most courts have recognized the rule as jurisdictional and then 
asserted jurisdiction in spite of it. The same practical considerations 
which underlie basic nonresident motorist statutes would seem to demand 
such holdings. The power of a state to provide a forum for suit against 
negligent nonresident motorists for the protection and convenience of its 
citizens can no longer be questioned.15 Where death results from the 
accident, an even clearer case for the assumption of jurisdiction is pre-
sented. The immunity rule developed at a time when society was not 
faced with the problems of mass mobility and destruction created by the 
automobile. It is not fitted to meet our present needs in this respect and 
should therefore be treated as inapplicable in the restricted nonresident 
motorist setting. Although not expressly stated, this is in effect the view 
that the courts sustaining the statutes have taken. The reasoning of the 
instant case is typical. The court makes no extended analysis of the con-
ventional jurisdictional defects. It simply states that the rule of limited 
territorial capacity must yield to the police power of the state in control 
of its highways.1a 
The principal case leaves open the question whether the foreign 
judgment will be given full faith and credit in the domiciliary state 
when it is presented there as a claim against the estate.17 Courts in the 
past have uniformly refused to give effect to a judgment rendered in 
another state against a domestic administrator on the ground that his 
308; Helme v. Buckelew, 229 N.Y. 363, 128 N.E. 216 (1920). See also CONFLICT OF LAWS 
REsrATEMENT §514 (1934). Contra: Dewey v. Barnhouse, 75 Kan. 214, 88 P. 877 (1907); 
Craig v. Toledo, A.A. &: N.M.R. Co., 2 Ohio N.P. 64 (1895). 
10 For an excellent discussion of the application of the general rule of immunity to 
a statute of the type under discussion see comment, 36 IowA L. REv. 128 (1950). 
11 Knoop v. Anderson, note 4 supra. 
12 McDOWELL, FOREIGN PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES 119 (1957): comment, 57 YALE L. J. 
647 at 652 (1948); Culp, "Recent Developments in Actions Against Nonresident Motorists," 
37 Mica. L. REv. 58 at 73 (1938). 
13 See generally 3 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS §512.1 (1935). See also the cases cited in 
note 9 supra in which statutes purporting to give jurisdiction over foreign personal 
representatives were invalidated. The courts so holding felt the rule was jurisdictional. 
14 The principal case, at 894, recognizes this as a possible analysis when it quotes 
from 57 YALE L. J. 647 at 652, note 12 supra. But the court does not predicate its holding 
on this theorv. 
15 Hess v.' Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927). 
16 Principal case at 895. 
17 Principal case at 894. 
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immunity to suit outside the state of his appointment deprived the sister 
state court of jurisdiction.18 Should this corollary to the general immunity 
rule be followed here, it is likely any judgment rendered in the present 
case would have to be relitigated in Nebraska to be enforced against the 
estate. This result could be avoided through recognition by Nebraska that 
in the nonresident motorist situation there is a legitimate basis for the 
exercise by Missouri of jurisdiction over a Nebraska administratrix. Thus 
the reason for denying full faith and credit disappears. If there is sufficient 
connection with the state to sustain jurisdiction as a matter of due proc-
ess, the requirements of full faith and credit in this respect are also met.19 
As more states amend their nonresident motorist statutes to encompass 
personal representatives, the more likely it is that full faith and credit 
will be given, whether required or not. A court which upholds the validity 
of such a statute will find itself in an anomalous position if it refuses to 
recognize judgments rendered under a similar statute in another state.20 
On the other hand, the full faith and credit question may in fact never 
arise. As a practical matter, if the deceased nonresident carried liability 
insurance, any judgment obtained may voluntarily be paid by the insurer. 
Even if the judgment is not paid, if the insurer is licensed to do business 
within the state the policy might be held to constitute an asset within the 
state for which ancillary administration may be granted.21 Missouri then 
could enforce its own judgment.22 
Thomas E. Kauper 
18 Judy v. Kelley, note 6 supra; In re Estate of Thompson v. Coyle &: Co., note 6 
supra; York v. Bank of Commerce &: Trust Co., 19 Tenn. App. 594, 93 S.W. (2d) 333 
(1935); In re Cowham's Estate, 220 Mich. 560, 190 N.W. 680 (1922); CONFLICT OF LAws 
REsTATEMENT §514 (1934). See generally McDOWELL, FOREIGN PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES 
85, 103-104 (1957). 
19 Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940); Riverside &: Dan River Cotton Mills v. 
Menefee, 237 U.S. 189 (1915). See CONFUCT OF LAws REsTATEMENT §42 (1934). 
20 Since Nebraska has enacted a statute of this type, Neb. Rev. Stat. (1943; re-issue 
1956) §25-530, but has not yet passed on its validity, it would be confronted with a diffi-
cult question if the judgment in the principal case is presented there for full faith and 
credit. 
21 In re Estate of Rogers, 164 Kan. 492, 190 P. (2d) 857 (1948); Furst v. Brady, 375 
Ill. 425, 31 N.E. (2d) 606 (1940); Gordon v. Shea, 300 Mass. 95, 14 N.E. (2d) 105 (1938). 
Contra, In re Roche, 16 N.J. 579, 109 A. (2d) 655 (1954). 
22 The court in the principal case, at 895, recognizes that the presence of liability 
insurance might make it unnecessary to present the claim in Nebraska, but it does not 
state whether this is because there might be voluntary payment or because ancillary 
administration might be granted. 
